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THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW non-legal consequences of his legal action-e.g., the loss of his job. If he refuses to answer on moral grounds, he satisfies his conscience but denies his obligation to the law, and thereby, if we are to believe certain conservative thinkers from Socrates' day to our own,6 endangers as well the very foundations of the social order. His personal risks in such a course are even greater, entailing possible imprisonment, and his only consolation would be the knowledge that he had displayed the virtue of courage, or, with Thoreau, the thought that "under a government which imprisons any unjustly, the true place for a just man is also a prison."6 If, however, he resorts to a legal instrument-e.g., the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution-which will enable him both to satisfy his conscience and by invoking another law to stay out of jail, he invites a further dilemma. For if he invokes the Fifth Amendment knowing that it does not strictly apply to his case-e.g., if he seeks to protect someone else, although under the self-incrimination clause he is not entitled to do so-he does not tell the truth and may thereby dishonor his moral code. Nor can he enjoy the consolation of having been courageous, if he now seeks to escape the consequences of a refusal to answer based solely on moral grounds. On the other hand, if he is convinced that a lie is necessary to achieve a greater good, he may find it difficult to understand why one who acts rightly should be expected to invite wrongful punishment. To one who believes that a lie is always wrong, such conduct is inexcusable. But to men sensitive to the fact that moral dilemmas arise precisely because a particular situation offers no clearcut distinction between right and wrong, and that it is sometimes impossible to do that which is good without doing or suffering something that is bad, the performance of what under other circumstances might be evil is then right, not wrong. Moral rules are often in conflict, and a moral man may have to choose between telling the truth or lying to do good. If the greater good is right, the lie-otherwise bad but now necessary to the good-is also right. It is at least questionable whether an ambassador (or a spy) who lies, when necessary, for the good of his country, merits moral censure.
The gravity of the dilemma is compounded (a) by the failure of law, in general, to protect men from the non-legal consequences of legal action, and (b) by the deliberate use of the law, on occasion, to expose men to non-legal sanctions against actions heretofore beyond the pale of legal penalty.
Appeal to the Fifth Amendment may protect a man from certain legal penalties ensuing from his refusal to answer questions that might tend to incriminate him, but it provides no legal protection against the economic or social consequences of his refusal. Thus a man who invokes the Fifth Amendment may find himself without a job and with little likelihood of obtaining one, ' at least in his established field of endeavor. He may find himself and his family ostracized as well as impoverished. He may discover that his reputation and good name have been sacrificed on the altar of conscience. He may begin then to understand the element of truth in Machiavelli's cynical advice to one who would win popular approval and support-that it is often better to seem good than to be good. And he may learn, perhaps when it is too late, the awful significance of the words of Sophocles' Chorus:
Tomorrow and for all time to come, As in the past, This law is immutable: For mortals greatly to live is greatly to suffer.7
Since it is the rare man who is willing to suffer greatly, the dire non-legal consequences of permissible legal action impose pressures that make difficult a right resolution of the moral dilemma. The citizen may obey the law not because he conceives it right to obey but because he fears the consequences of disobedience. This introduces a new element into the problem, namely, the question of the moral obligation of the state to protect a citizen from social punishment when certain legal authorities or private powers disapprove his act, however unobjectionable it may be on strictly legal grounds. Does the state have an obligation to guarantee to a citizen not merely the constitutional right to refuse to answer questions with an incriminating bias, but also the legal right to protection from non-legal sanctions attendant upon such refusal?
It would be futile to deny that an affirmative answer to this last question leads into patent (and perhaps insuperable) difficulties, not the least of these being the dangers involved in unduly extending the sphere of state intervention. But the question of the state's obligation is not for this reason to be avoided. For if the Constitution is the final legal norm from which all subsidiary law derives its validity, then the protection of the Constitution must be made real and not simply formal. This can be achieved only when (a) the Constitution is applied not merely against de jure governments but against citizens and groups who comprise de facto or private governments that proclaim "laws" and impose sanctions, and (b) the laws of the state and the actions of governmental authorities conform both to the letter and to the spirit of the Constitution, i.e., they avoid so maltreating men as to expose them to non-legal sanctions where no legal punishments are or have been intended. These principles, especially the former, may appear at first blush to embody a revolutionary proposal. Clearly, they require distinctions which are not likely to admit of mathematically precise application. On the one hand, there are certain social and economic consequences of lawful action which the state cannot prevent or eliminate even if it seeks to do so-e.g., the suspicion in the minds of some people that a man acquitted of a charge of rape or murder is nonetheless 
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THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW guilty.8 On the other hand, there are certain cases in which the state should not intervene even if it could do so e.g., the dismissal from the police force of an officer who refuses, despite the direct and obvious nexus between the information sought and the responsibilities of his position, to testify even before a nonlegal but properly constituted tribunal of his superior officers concerning his alleged collaboration with dope-peddlers. But between these two extremes there still remains a vast intermediate range of instances in which governments may properly undertake to protect men from non-legal sanctions which in effect invalidate a constitutional or legal right. In line with this principle-a principle long grasped by some of our more perceptive legal and political thinkers9 and incorporated in considerable measure into American constitutional law by the decision of the Supreme Court in United States v. Classic10 more than a decade ago-governments have in fact sponsored legislation which, like the Wagner Act, prevented an employer from dismissing an employee for joining a labor union, or which, like fair employment practices acts, seeks to curb certain discriminatory practices by private powers. And it is in line with this same principle that governments might well prevent a university from dismissing a member of its faculty if his sole offense is that he has invoked the protection of the Constitution in refusing to answer questions put to him by a legislative investigating committee. I do not mean to imply by this that a refusal to testify under protection of the Fifth Amendment is necessarily to be condoned. But it ought not to be automatically condemned; for a decision not to testify may involve profound and complex ethical as well as legal considerations to which automatic condemnation and consequent social punishment are blind, not to mention the fact that they violate the spirit of the constitutional amendment itself.
Similar considerations support the proposition that legal authorities are to be condemned when they circumvent, and indeed violate, the Constitution in employing indirect (non-legal) sanctions to coerce an individual in cases where the law itself does not give them that power. Consider, for example, the not infrequent behavior of a congressional investigating committee. If the primary purpose of and warrant for such a committee is to gather information as a basis for recommending legislation, then a private or closed hearing would normally enable it to achieve this end without exposing the citizen to non-legal penalties. If the committee is not only indifferent to this last consideration but, through a second and open hearing that adds nothing but publicity to answers already vouchsafed or refused by the witness, deliberately contrives a situation that brings social and economic sanctions into play, it in effect converts such non-legal sanctions into indirect forms of legal action. This all too common effect of the sustained congressional investigations into the loyalty of university professors and others is a calculated perversion of power that raises serious questions concerning the justice of governmental behavior.
What is involved, consequently, is not only the obligation of the citizen to the state but also the responsibility of the state certainly, at least, of a constitutional state-to the citizen.
The dilemma of the citizen, then, may derive not simply from a conflict between the commands of the state and the dictates of his conscience. It may emerge as well from the incompatibility of an enacted law or of the acts of governmental authorities or of private powers with the constitution of the state, understanding by the constitution not simply the written rules that comprise a revered document but the logic or underlying principle of the system which the Constitution (written and unwritten) is supposed to represent. In this circumstance the dilemma of the citizen takes another, and perhaps more aggravated, form than Antigone's moral problem; for the citizen here believes that he is being loyal to the Constitution in rejecting the obligation to obey the law (or the bidding of a legal authority). He is not pitting simply his conscience against the law but also the law against the Constitution. He is asserting that in defending the fundamental law he is being more loyal than those who would compel him to violate it. He invokes not (or not merely) the Fifth but the First Amendment, which, while thus far rejected by the courts in such cases, nevertheless appears to him the proper ground on which to take his stand.1" It is easy to say, and to say rightly, that there are legal mechanisms for the resolution of a conflict between an enacted law (or the bidding of a legal authority) and the Constitution, and that it is not the business of the citizen to displace such mechanisms by self-arrogation. But such mechanisms e.g., the Supreme Court do not always restrict social or economic or religious power groups from attaching severe penalties to action that is legally right. What is legally right may be deemed socially or economically or morally wrong. Consequently, the moral question for the citizen remains, all the more so since there is no legal 11 It is not without interest that even a near-absolutist like Hobbes would in the immediate circumstances seem to sanction a man's refusal to obey. "No man," Hobbes declared, "is tied by any compacts whatsoever to accuse himself, or any other, by whose damage he is like to procure himself a bitter life . .. yet in a public trial he may, by torture, be forced to make answer. But such answers are no testimony of the fact, but helps for the searching out of truth; insomuch that whether the party tortured answer true or false, or whether he answer not at all, whatsoever he doth, he doth it by right." De Cive, II, 19.
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III
What, then, is the citizen to do? If he obeys the law, he may violate his conscience. If he obeys his conscience, he may violate the law. If he obeys his conscience and seeks to vindicate his alleged disobedience by invoking the protection of the Constitution, he exposes himself to social or economic sanctions that are sometimes more powerful than the legal penalties that might have been applied had he not claimed that protection. The state, where it is not itself the deliberate provocateur, is indifferent to his fate in this last circumstance. Should he then be indifferent to the state?
The answer of the state, at least, is clear. It is no. There can be no law to which obedience is optional, no command to which the state attaches an "if you please." Consequently, there can be no legal right to disobey the law. Nor will the state, customarily, recognize a moral claim to disobedience. It may be urged that conscientious objectors often escape the prescribed legal punishments by appealing to a higher law. But this is only half true. For they escape such consequences only because a court or a statute admits such a claim as a legal one. The state, so to speak, incorporates the higher law into the positive law; it proclaims that in such cases it is lawful for some men to follow a certain course of action denied to the populace at large.
The state, then, demands obedience to its laws; and while it employs (or can employ) a number of different arguments to vindicate this claim,'2 its primary justification is the ground that such obedience is essential to the maintenance of the social order. Order, it is said, is better than disorder; and if men are free to set aside the laws of the state whenever they find them in conflict with their private interests, particular religion, or individual sense of morality, anarchy will result. Disobedience to the laws, therefore, involves an attack on the state itself. It is an act of rebellion, an attempt to subvert the foundations of the entire system of order which it is the business of the state to secure. This is Why Socrates rejected Crito's suggestion that he flee to escape execution. What reply could he make, Socrates asked Crito, if the Athenian government should come to him and say: He could, Crito admitted, make no answer. Since by his failure to emigrate Socrates had agreed to abide by the laws, he could not now disavow that covenant. He could not through disobedience seek to overthrow the state.'4 Clearly there is merit in this position. Order is a necessary condition to the achievement of larger values; and if order is to be maintained there must be power, and a general readiness on the part of men to abide by the commands of power. But the merit is a relative one. Order in itself is not a sufficient condition for the realization of those values, and a government which merely secures order without, or at the expense of, those larger values, lacks moral vindication. Under such circumstances, it might well be argued that anarchy or disorder is to be preferred-not for its own sake but for the opportunity it provides to recreate the requisite conditions for a better human existence. Thus, while order is good, it is not necessarily the highest good. We must still distinguish the just or the decent order; we must still recognize that order is but a means to some larger end.'5 Epictetus may command our sympathy when he observes: "Did heaven owe me perfect parents?-No; it owed me parents." But, as Aristotle reminded Plato, it is surely a shallow philosophy that ignores the vast difference between a family and a state. And if we are to adhere to the principle of democracy, then not order but a certain kind of order-one based on opinion, on consent-constitutes the necessary framework of justice.
This being so, it is hard to see what absolute moral claim democracy can make on those who withhold their fundamental consent. Anarchists, communists, fascists, and others who deny-not through revolutionary action but through civil disobedience-the authority of the social order which democracy seeks to maintain, appeal instead to some alternative principle of justice. If they obey the laws of democracy, they do so for reasons of expediency, not of principle. It is true that fascists like Lawrence Dennis who affirm fidelity to the notion that might makes right are by this standard logically committed to the acceptance of democracy where it prevails; for democracy by virtue of the fact that it prevails has might and is therefore "right."' But democracy is not responsible for the confused arguments of its opponents. Nor can it without denying its very essence stand on any principle other than that of generalized consent. Consequently, democracy must recognize that for men who reject its values and refuse their assent to its system of order the dictates of demo- 14 The fact that Socrates was in prison at the very moment he was thus arguing against Crito's plea that he disobey the law, reinforces the contention in note 1 above that Socrates did not actually accept this position; that he was in fact prepared to yield only a qualified obedience to the laws. 15 For this reason skeptics have put the argument for social order not in terms of right but in terms of convenience. The difficulty here, of course, is that it then becomes "right" to disobey whenever the social order ceases to be convenient. 
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THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW cratic government appear as the commands of an illegitimate power. And where that power can be defied, especially with some expectation of success, opponents of democracy will claim a moral right to do so. In this regard they claim no more, on purely formalistic grounds, with respect to democratic systems than democrats do with respect to oligarchical systems. Hence the problem for democracy is not that of validating its own claim to their obedience, but that of allowing them that degree of civil disobedience which will balance the need for its own institutional preservation with its ultimate values, especially the provision for maximum free play for the individual conscience. Democracy can, to be sure, offer an opposing value judgment; but it cannot-without invoking intuition or divine or natural sanction or the proposition that might makes right-prove that its value system is truly best. Consequently, while democracy must, in defense of its own values, reject the scheme of justice proposed by the anti-democrats, it must at the same time face the uncomfortable fact that on intrinsic grounds it lacks an absolute moral standard in terms of which it can justly disavow the right of civil disobedience to those who deny the validity of the social order. ' It may of course be argued that men who reject democracy should leave the state, that if they stay, as Socrates stayed, they assume the obligation to obey its laws.'8 And we have, in point of fact, instances in our time in which the right of egress has been exercised e.g., T. S. Eliot, George Santayana, and Ezra Pound; even, perhaps, Alexander Berkman and Emma Goldman, who rejoiced when they arrived (albeit after an unintended and involuntary voyage) in Lenin's Russia. But apart from the practical objections that the state does not always grant the right of egress and that there may not be another state which embodies the "right" political system and social order-witness the tragic tale of Emma Goldman's disenchantment with Russia'9-I fail to comprehend the moral character of this solution. I recognize that while on intrinsic grounds democracy affirms that each man's conscience is "right," it must set instrumental limits on this "right"; that, operationally speaking, the notion that each man is entitled to have any conscience he wants does not imply that he has a right to subordinate the laws to his conscience. Nevertheless, if democracy insists that all men are subject to the laws, it must also insist that all men are 17 Some writers have sought in intuition or in natural law an "objective" criterion in terms of which they could show that democracy is intrinsically and not merely instrumentally best-e.g., protected by the laws, that all men have an equal right (say) to life and liberty. A majority under this principle has no absolute moral justification to limit this right except where it has secured the consent of the governed-not, of course, in the sense that consent is given to each particular law, but in the sense that generalized consent or consensus is accorded the system under which that majority has come to power. This being so, what moral principle justifies a democracy in going outside the area of consent to deny the right of civil disobedience to a recalcitrant individual or minority? What principle other than force gives a democratic people the right to exclude those who reject democracy from that portion of the earth possessed by the democrats? Clearly, the argument asserts only that the bulk of the people regard a particular system as just, and that those who do not accept this valuation shall nonetheless be required to submit.20 But if consent is acknowledged to be the ultimate source of authority, the appeal to force leaves unanswered (where it does not negate) the question of justice whether that system is good or, indeed, best. This is not to deny that even the best system may depend on a measure of force to maintain itself; it is only to affirm that the resort to force, even when successful, cannot of itself establish that a system is best.
I return, therefore, to the position that where consent is withheld from the entire system of order itself, democracy's claim to obedience with respect to such dissidents rests on power, not on a universal morality. Consequently, democracy cannot insist, without denying its own framework of justice-the principle of consent-that such individuals or groups obey the law. In such cases it can only resort to the rule of expediency referred to above-namely, that of disallowing only that expression of the individual conscience which is incompatible with democracy's own ultimate values and institutional preservation.2 20 This was clearly perceived by Justice Holmes, who with typical frankness wrote to Frederick Pollock: "I do think that man at present is a predatory animal. I think that the sacredness of human life is a purely municipal ideal of no validity outside the jurisdiction. I believe that force, mitigated so far as may be by good manners, is the ultima ratio, and between two groups that want to make inconsistent kinds of worlds I see no remedy except force. 21 I am not unaware of the objection that the state cannot regard as irrelevant the effects of such disobedience on others. There is an immense difference, it is said, between disobeying the law when it conflicts with my principles or preferences if such disobedience does not injure others, and disobeying the law at the cost of injury to others. This argument has great force, and in general I think it proper that men should obey even unjust laws when disobedience has the effect of worsening, rather than improving, the situation. But the argument seems to me also to beg two of the very questions at issue: whether the law (and more important the system itself) does in fact injure others, and whether the numerical calculus is a proper principle of justice. In disobeying the law under the circum-
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Of those who accept democracy as the theoretically or practically best political order, yet contemplate disobedience to the law, two classes of citizens must, I think, be distinguished. One denies the intrinsic merit or rationality of the law itself; the other challenges as well the claim of the particular form of state enacting the law to be called a democracy.
For this latter group, democracy is good but the state is not democratic; hence with respect to the principle of political obligation their attitude toward the political order is not essentially different from that of those who accept the state as democratic but deny that democracy is good. They not only argue, with Aristotle,22 that a government democratic in form may be oligarchical in fact; they insist further that a careful examination of the American political system discloses it to be formally insufficient as well. From their point of view, the American Senate (based on a quota system that does violence to the principle of popular representation), the Supreme Court (with its power of judicial review), the staggered system of elections (which not infrequently prevents a popular majority from becoming a legal or controlling majority), the involved apparatus that separates and checks powers so as to deadlock no less than to balance them, the amending clause (which puts the Constitution itself beyond the reach of normal majorities)-all these and more (e.g., suffrage restrictions, gerrymandering, and the like) are but devices to hinder and at times effectively to block the translation of public opinion into public policy. Even the sacred rules of the game may be changed by the group in power when those rules no longer operate to that group's advantage. This is amply evidenced by the history of the Supreme Court with respect, for example, to the Fourteenth Amendment.
Knowing these things (or feeling this way), a citizen confronted by what he conceives to be a morally reprehensible law (or an action under that law) has difficulty in accepting the argument that he should express his disapproval not through civil disobedience but through the regular legal and political channels available to him. In his view, it is simply not true that these legal and political channels are available to him, that is, available in the way that democracy ideally requires. Such a citizen might agree that all human contrivances are imperfect. He might admit, too, that it is great folly, if not fanaticism, to insist on the perfectibility of political institutions regardless of consequences. Nevertheless, if it is not simply to evoke his blind acquiescence, a democratic system must above all be democratic; it must embody to a major degree elements of that stances cited here, the dissident takes the position that it is the law (and the system of order as well) which inflicts the injury, and that by disobeying the law he is calling the attention of the people to the injustice of the state. Moreover, if justice involves injury to others, then it is "just" that such injury be inflicted upon them. (In this event, of course, the dissident might well contend that the injury is apparent rather than real.) In any case, the objection does little more than return us to the fundamental issue at stake: which of the conflicting value systems is truly best or just?
22 Politics, 1292b.
DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 397 just political order which it purportedly represents. If it falls so far short of this ideal as to foreclose any real possibility of correcting legislative evils by (say) normal majorities, if the political mechanism obstructs public opinion by institutionalizing various forms of minority control, it is in fact not a democracy at all. It is a perverted form of democratic government and, as such, it is bound to rely on unjust laws.23
To the extent that there is substance in this view-in the sense that the indictment of institutional arrangements is sound-men committed to democracy are under no moral obligation to obey "undemocratic" laws. Those who place a different weight on the shortcomings of the system may deplore their judgment in this regard, but if the shortcomings are serious and real they cannot in democracy's name be asked to give absolute obedience to a less-than-democratic (and to this degree undemocratic) system. Like the good churchgoers of Concord who were taken ill when Thoreau asked them also to read the Bible, protagonists of the system might well be discomfited and silenced when confronted, for instance, by a Negro suffering political and educational discrimination in one of our states, or an interned Nisei, who to justify an act of civil disobedience asks but a single question: "Is this the content of democracy?" V We come, finally, to those democrats who accept the system as essentially democratic and who are prepared, on the whole, to obey the laws. They understand that government by consent means consent not to each particular law but to the entire system of order itself, and ultimately to the idea of justice which that system represents. For the sake of the greater good secured by that system through its government and its laws, they accept specific enactments which they otherwise disapprove. They obey not necessarily because they think that the law is right, but because they think it right to obey the law. still applies: it is not the state that produces cohesive will; it is will that creates and sustains the state.30 Political loyalties and political obligations do not exclude other loyalties and other obligations, and it is the meaning of democracy that it does not seek to command a monopoly of man's allegiances. Democracy seeks to root its fundamental unity not in the power of the state but in the sense of common interest that sustains but does not obliterate the vital differences among men.3' So long as these differences are admitted, with respect not simply to things that do not matter much but to things that touch the very heart of the existing order as well,32 the democratic state can find its essential solidarity not in the structure of law but in the minds of men. Nor does the absolutist position rest on solid ground when it assumes that all laws form a coherent unity, so that disobedience to a particular law necessarily involves the destruction of the entire system of law. Evasion of the law is a normal concomitant of all legal systems, and it is doubtful that the existence of jails constitutes sufficient proof of the breakdown of the system. We are all familiar with the propensity of people not in jails to disobey laws that inconvenience them-e.g., traffic regulations, income tax laws, and prohibitions on gambling and on the traffic in liquor and women. Police and other political officials do not enforce all laws equally and at times they conspire with people who seek to disobey them. Governments too evade or disobey the law-witness the oft-cited examples of Southern states that have largely ignored the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the American Constitution; of the many Congresses that have failed to apply the constitutional provision (Sec. 2, Amend. XIV) requiring that the representation of such states in the House of Representatives be reduced; and of the refusal of the Congress in 1920 to carry out the required reapportionment of the House of Representatives. Despite these and other acts of disobedience, the system of law has not, I think, disappeared. Clearly, some laws are not essential to the maintenance of the social order.
If, therefore, the state is not equivalent to the whole of the social order, and if all laws are not integrated into a single coherent unity, disobedience to a particular law need not imply an attempt to overthrow the political system or the social order itself. To Dickinson's charge that the conflict is between the individual and all that the sovereign stands for, we must reply: the conflict is also between the sovereign and all that the individual stands for. It may even, in fact, be between the actual sovereign and all that the ideal sovereign stands for. In 
